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I will respond to some of their criticisms, but I want to say at the outset that in my view, when
you publish something, you put it out there for all eyes to see from their own perspective. And
so, I believe that all criticisms are fair. Not all are correct. But all are fair. We live in a
Rashomon world (Kaplan, 2011, 504–505).
I owe thanks to Joshua Gert and Keith Allen for their thoughtful critical
responses to my book, The Red and The Real: An Essay on Color Ontology
(henceforth, RR). In this essay I respond to what I take to be the most important
objections they raise.
1 Gert: Color Relationalism and the Multiple As-
pects View
Although there is much on which Gert and I disagree, we are united in taking
seriously as a constraint on theories of color ontology (as many have not) the
significant variation in the way visual systems respond to one and the same
color stimulus under different circumstances. Furthermore, we agree that
much of this variation is blameless in the sense that (at least in many cases) no
one variant should be theoretically distinguished from all the others as being
uniquely veridical. That said, we disagree about the scope of application of
such considerations about perceptual variation with respect to color, and about
what conclusions should be drawn from them.
With respect to scope, I urge in RR that instances of perceptual variation
arise in what appears to be a structurally identical form in intrapersonal cases
(a single visual system responds differently to a single object in different
perceptual conditions), interpersonal cases (the visual systems of different
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people respond differently to a single object in the very same perceptual
condition), and interspecies cases (the visual systems of organisms from
different species respond differently to a single object in the very same
perceptual condition). Given this apparent uniformity, I advocate a treatment
of perceptual variation that extends smoothly to all such instances, and take
it to be a benefit of the relationalist view about color defended in that work
that it does extend — in what I hope is a theoretically satisfying way — to all
these sorts of structurally similar variation. The key relationalist move, in a
nutshell, is that we can accommodate the contemplated forms of variation by
treating colors as relations to perceivers and perceptual circumstances. Thus,
just as we can reconcile something’s being your sister but not mine by treating
sisterhood as a relation to individuals, we can reconcile something’s looking red
to you in your circumstance but looking not red to me in my circumstance by
treating redness as a relation to perceivers and circumstances. Thus, for the
color relationalist, the varying responses of visual systems to a single stimulus
are states that represent distinct fine-grained relational properties such as red
for S1 in C1, green for S2 in C2, etc.
In contrast, Gert is relatively unmoved by the apparent structural similarity
of the different forms of variation, and appeals to different strategies to account
for them. He proposes that his frankly hybrid approach to perceptual variation
is, on balance, more plausible and less revisionary than relationalism, and
therefore should be preferred to the latter on general grounds of rational
conservatism even if, as he grants, there is nothing internally inconsistent or
otherwise incoherent about the relationalist picture.
Below I’ll consider Gert’s objections against relationalism, and then assess
the cluster of alternative strategies he offers to put in its place. I’ll argue
that relationalism is in better shape, and that his alternative approaches to
perceptual variation are in worse shape, than Gert allows.
Before I begin, here are two remarks about objections I won’t be making.
First, in what follows I won’t be plumping for my own account of variation
over Gert’s on grounds of theoretical uniformity. I agree with his contention
that uniformity is a merely prima facie virtue that can be trumped by other
considerations. While I think uniformity can be helpful in choosing between
accounts that are otherwise very close competitors, there are in my opinion
sufficiently many other differences between Gert’s view and my own that
there’s no need to appeal to the merely prima facie, defeasible consideration
of theoretical uniformity to choose between them. Accordingly, I’ll put
uniformity aside. Second, in order to keep the discussion manageable, I’ll also
mostly (except for note 21) ignore issues about interspecies variation; instead,
I’ll follow Gert in concentrating mainly on intrapersonal and interpersonal
variation.
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1.1 Relationalism and Intrapersonal Variation
1.1.1 An Objectionable Revisionism?
Gert’s first reason for rejecting relationalism as an account of intrapersonal
perceptual variation is his allegation that (particularly compared to the mul-
tiple aspects view he advocates; see below) color relationalism is objectionably
revisionary — that it is “radical,” “surprising,” and “a little crazy.”1 He writes,
I think it is safe to say that relationalism is not the preferred view
of the philosophically or scientifically unsophisticated. Nor is it
the preferred view of the philosophically sophisticated. After all,
even in the philosophical literature, the claims that snow is white,
blood red, and grass green are often taken as staple examples of the
simplest, most basic and uncontroversial truths (2).
I believe this overestimates the revisionism of color relationalism.
It is indeed plausible that color relationalism, as developed in RR, goes
beyond what common sense and untutored intuition tell us directly about
color. This is, I take it, mostly what because common sense and untutored
intuition tell us directly is much less than what it takes to spell out an adequate
account of the metaphysics of color (or of much of anything). On the other
hand, it is much less obvious whether and how relationalism says things that
conflict with the deliverances of common sense.2 Now, some have argued that
relationalism conflicts with the broadly manifest image of color in some more
indirect way — e.g., by making false predictions about the phenomenology of
color experience or about how we ascribe colors to objects in natural language.
I take these worries seriously, and devote part II of RR to showing that these
ostensible conflicts are merely apparent — that the relationalist can explain, or
explain away, the evidence that is claimed to tell against it. But Gert doesn’t
object to any of those proposed explanations on behalf of relationalism, so I
doubt that this is the source of his dissatisfaction.
It is also true that philosophers not addressing themselves directly to issues
about color use ordinary color ascriptions as examples of allegedly basic truths
(which, according to my version of color relationalism, they are not). But it is
not clear that this reflects any widely held deep anti-relationalist commitment
as opposed to a provisional assumption inspired by the surface simplicity of
(some) color predications — a pro tanto assumption made mainly in order to
1I am gratified that he also calls the view “philosophically interesting” and “cool”.
Unfortunately, in the context in which they occur, these are pretty clearly not intended as desirable
attributes. Ah, well.
2To be sure, some philosophers have claimed (mostly without evidence) that naive intuition
is directly at odds with the relationalist metaphysics of color. However, when investigators have
actually solicited naive intuitions about the question of how colors are metaphysically constituted
they have found that the latter are considerably more open to color relationalism than many have
claimed (Cohen and Nichols, 2010). See also Allen (2012), who claims that “relationalism (or
something approximating it) is a commonly held philosophical position amongst undergraduates”
(11).
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have some or other working example of a simple property.3 On the other hand,
if there is a received view of the metaphysics of color among philosophers,
that view is arguably some kind of dispositionalism — roughly, the view
that colors are dispositions of objects to affect certain kinds of perceivers in
certain kinds of conditions. For example, many find this view endorsed in the
writings of the great modern philosophers (e.g., Galileo, Boyle, Newton, and
Locke); more recent dispositionalists include McGinn (1983); Peacocke (1984);
Johnston (1992). But since dispositionalism is a species of relationalism, there is
a reasonable case to be made that the received philosophical view about color
is relationalist.
I don’t place much argumentative importance on these sociological obser-
vations, but do take them to suggest that relationalism is not quite so at odds
with either common sense or philosophical tradition as Gert claims.
1.1.2 Uniformity and The Pink Shirt
Gert’s main substantive objection to relationalism is that that view describes
poorly our experience of a materially uniform pink shirt whose color appear-
ance systematically changes across its spatial extent — perhaps it is brighter
in a region closer to the room’s light source, and darker in a fold where it is
shadowed. Gert wants to say that this shirt is one uniform color over its entire
spatial extent, and is worried that relationalism does not easily make room for
this description. The worry is that, precisely because the relationalist takes
the spatially varying color appearances to reveal distinct relational colors that
the shirt genuinely exemplifies, she “must also say that talk of the color of the
shirt, with the uniqueness the definite article implies, cannot be taken literally”
(4). Gert recognizes that relationalism comes with two kinds of resources
relevant to the description of the pink shirt, though he doesn’t explain the
relation between them, and instead treats them as independent lines of possible
response to the case. In any event, he finds both of these lines of thought
unsatisfactory, and so concludes that relationalism is inadequate to the case.
The first relationalist resource Gert considers is addressed to the intuition
that the visually distinguishable regions of the shirt are visually represented
as being in some sense uniform or stable. The relationalist account of this
stability intuition rests in the observation that, though the distinct regions
may occurrently exemplify different relational colors, they satisfy the following
counterfactual: if, counterfactually, they were presented under the very same
perceptual conditions, they would be a perceptual match (for certain kinds of
visual systems, such as those of many ordinary trichromatic human beings).
Hence, the many occurrently visually distinguishable regions of the materially
uniform shirt all share the common — viz., stable across the shirt’s spatial
extent — property of being such that they would be perceptual matches were
they presented under a fixed set of perceptual circumstances.
3I agree that if color properties are relational, this relationality does not show up explicitly in
the surface form of (many) color predications; for discussion, see RR, chapter 4.
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Gert accepts that there is this spatially stable property of the shirt’s regions,
and that it is visually represented. But he rejects this as an alternative
account of the stability intuition on the grounds that it depends, ultimately, on
something the relationalist rejects — the representation of a uniform color. Gert
allows that at least some of the mechanisms contributing to color constancy
might license representation of the counterfactual property to the regions
without assigning a uniform categorical color. For example, he considers
a strategy involving comparison of cone-excitations ratios of affected cone
types across a luminance edge; the thought is that if the ratios are similar
(although absolute excitation levels may differ), then this provides evidence
that the counterfactual property holds between two regions, and does so
without depending on assigning a common categorical color to the regions.
But since, he says, this mechanism is at best one limited component of the mix
of distinct mechanisms contributing to color constancy, it cannot plausibly be
extended to all the cases where the stability intuition holds. And he thinks that
there is only one explanation of the counterfactual property that does extend
to all the cases where the stability intuition holds: the visual representation
of the distinct regions as exemplifying a shared categorical color. But, of
course, the relationalist cannot allow that. In short, then, the worry is that
the relationalist’s attempted explanation of the spatial stability of the pink
shirt (in terms of the counterfactual property) must ultimately depend on the
recognition that the shirt exemplifies a uniform color throughout its spatial
extent, pace relationalism.4
This objection is unpersuasive for several reasons. First, while I sympathize
strongly with Gert’s claim that color constancy is an interaction effect (Cohen,
2012), Gert’s objection turns on estimates about the range of cases to which
different contributory mechanisms are applicable that, given the present state
of understanding, we’re not in a position to make with any confidence.
Second, notwithstanding the last point, the range of cases for which there
are relationalist-friendly explanations of the counterfactual property is con-
siderably broader than Gert suggests, if only because (despite his framing of
the issue exclusively in terms of cone excitation ratios) there are a variety of
current proposals about the mechanisms subserving the computation of color
constancy that work (or can be made to work) without prior assignments
of uniform properties to surfaces.5 Given this point, one might reasonably
4Crucially, Gert is not objecting (as is Tye (2012), for example) that relationalism is unable to
provide a story about the stability intuition. Rather, he is objecting that the story that (he allows)
it does provide turns out to depend on mechanisms that cannot be understood other than in terms
of the assignment of a uniform color.
5For example, there are models that begin from assumptions about the kinds of surfaces
corresponding to median/extremal lightness values, and compute from these models of the
incident illumination (Land and McCann, 1971; Buchsbaum, 1980; Gilchrist et al., 1999). Similarly,
there are views that attempt to recover a model of the illumination from information about mutual
reflections in the scene (Funt et al., 1991), the boundaries of regions known to be specular reflections
(D’Zmura and Lennie, 1986; Lee, 1986), and shadows (D’Zmura, 1992). And there are proposals
that appeal directly to assumptions about higher order scene statistics, (Golz and MacLeod, 2002;
MacLeod, 2003; Brainard et al., 2006). My point is (of course) not that any of these accounts is
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be optimistic about the range of cases to which this sort of model applies.
Third, and most significantly, it is simply not true that, in order to account
for the stability intuition, relationalists must forswear appeal to representation
of any uniform property of regions they claim are distinct in color. In order
for an explanation of the stability intuition to abide by the relationalist’s
commitment that such regions differ in color, it only must be true that any such
shared properties appealed to in the explanation are not colors. This matters
because computational models of color constancy don’t — indeed, can’t — by
themselves come with a (motivated) reason for identifying one sort of property
as a color.6 For that you need a metaphysical account of color. Therefore, in the
context of the current dispute about what the colors are, if it should turn out
(for whatever reason) that the relationalist needs to say that two regions she
distinguishes in color share a common property, that doesn’t conflict with her
relationalism. In light of these considerations, I don’t see that Gert’s objections
show any substantial weakness in the relationalist’s account of the stability
intuition.
The case of the pink shirt suggests another intuition that makes for a prima
facie challenge to relationalism; this is the intuition that what the visual system
represents about the color of the shirt is not just stable/uniform, but also
unique (hence, as Gert points out, we freely talk about the color of the shirt). Of
course, relationalism entails that the shirt has a large (perhaps infinite) number
of fine-grained relational colors, and so appears to conflict directly with the
uniqueness intuition. However, the relationalist can resolve this apparent
conflict by reference to the idea (discussed in RR, chapter 4) that the colors
we ordinarily think and talk about — and the referents of the not-explicitly-
relativized color predicates of natural languages — are relatively coarse-
grained relational properties relativized to contextually salient perceivers and
contextually salient viewing conditions. On this view, an utterance of ‘a is pink’
in context K attributes to a the property pink for the perceivers relevant in context
K under the perceptual circumstances relevant in K (RR, 100). In saying that
Gert’s imagined shirt exemplifies this coarse-grained relational property, the
relationalist need not give up her claim that the shirt additionally exemplifies
a large number of fine-grained relational properties (pink for S1 in C1, red for S2
in C2, etc.), Rather, she claims that there is a further relational color property
— one that is the target of much of our ordinary thinking and speaking about
color, that the shirt exemplifies as well. And I take it that the shirt plausibly
does exemplify the latter property relative to the context in which Gert wanted
to attribute pinkness to it — otherwise he would not have felt confident in
saying that it is uniformly pink without further qualification.
Crucially, the relationalist will hold that the shirt’s coarse-grained relational
property is not just one among its many colors; rather, she will say that its
adequate to the range of cases by itself, but that the menu of options is wider than Gert’s discussion
suggests.
6This is so even conceding (as I am prepared to do for the sake of argument) a fairly robust sort
of psychological realism about the computational models under discussion, without which Gert’s
objection doesn’t get off the ground.
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coarse-grained color occupies a special role in our thinking about color because
this property is (as the others are not) relativized to the kinds of perceivers
and perceptual circumstances relevant in the context of attribution. And this
gives the relationalist materials to account for the uniqueness intuition. Her
story will be that, even if there is not just one unique color that the shirt
exemplifies, we can sensibly use the expression ‘the color of the shirt’ to pick
out the one unique color relativized to contextually relevant perceivers and
contextually relevant circumstances. (Analogy: although there is not just one
unique remaining beer in the universe, we can sensibly use the expression
‘the remaining beer’ to pick out the unique beer remaining in the contextually
relevant refrigerator.)
While it seems to me that this explanation accounts well for the uniqueness
intuition, Gert disagrees, and objects that the proposed account overgeneral-
izes:
. . . even a patchwork shirt could be uniformly pink in this sense
[viz., that of exemplifying the coarse-grained color pink for the con-
textually relevant perceivers under the contextually relevant perceptual
circumstances], as long as each of the slightly differently colored
pink patches would appear to be some shade of pink to normal
viewers. But the shirt of our example is not like this (5).
But this objection is puzzling. Gert is right that the shirt of his initial
example and the patchwork shirt differ: the former but not the latter is
chromatically stable or uniform (in the sense of the stability intuition discussed
above). However as discussed, the relationalist can agree that the initial pink
shirt is and the patchwork shirt is not stable, and indeed has an account of
this difference (given in terms of counterfactuals relating distinct regions of
each shirt). Admittedly, the case might make trouble for the relationalist if
we had reason for believing that whatever relationalists say to account for the
uniqueness intuition must also serve as an account of the stability intuition.
But we don’t, so it doesn’t.
1.2 Gert on Intrapersonal Variation
As noted, Gert criticizes the relationalist account of intrapersonal variation as
part of a comparative case for what he claims is a more conservative “multiple
aspects” view, on which (non-relational) colors can present (veridically) a
variety of aspects, appearances, or ways/modes of appearance under different
conditions:
On this view colors can present different aspects in different view-
ing conditions, just as shapes can. . . . it should be apparent to
readers that it can be obvious that a surface is uniform in color even
though the appearance of the surface changes quite considerably
from region to region — as in the example of the pink shirt (4).
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By holding that distinct aspects of this kind can non-competitively present
colors, Gert hopes that his view can, like relationalism, avoid the difficulty of
having to single out one perceptual variant as being uniquely veridical. But he
hopes the view can secure this benefit without committing to what he regards
as the revisionary excesses of relationalism.
When considered so schematically, Gert’s guiding idea that colors present
multiple appearances is attractive. However, it is far less clear just how this
idea should be understood more precisely, and whether it can be extended into
a coherent view that is both plausible and an alternative to color relationalism.7
Putting that point aside, one pressing worry about the proposal is that it
seems to mislocate the subject matter of ordinary color discourse.8 Thus, an
observer who claims that an a 510nm spectral light is unique green appears to
be, and is ordinarily described as, reporting on the light’s color.9 But on the
multiple aspects view, the state/report is not about the light’s color, but about
the way its color is presented.10
7In particular, it is worrying that the view helps itself to a technical notion of “aspects” or
“appearances” of color properties that cries out for further elucidation. Initially, one might hope
to dispel the mystery surrounding the relevant “aspects” by identifying them with some sort
of perceptual modes of presentation of properties — roughly, perceptual analogues of Fregean
senses for perceived objects; unfortunately, however, there is deep controversy surrounding
the comparatively clear case of the interpretation of Fregean senses in language, and even
less consensus about whether and how the apparatus might be extended to perception. Gert
acknowledges this, but tells us that he is content to fall back on a “less technical interpretation
of ‘mode of presentation’, on which it means ‘way of appearing’ ” (8).
Fair enough. But it is not obvious that the thin notion of ways of appearing found in ordinary
discourse is ultimately coherent or compatible with other well-justified commitments (this is
something we would expect to see worked out in a theoretical elaboration, not in common usage
itself). Moreover, I doubt that the common sense notion is sufficiently committal to guarantee that
distinct ways of appearing can avoid conflict, as Gert needs them to: after all, sometimes we do say
that the way something appears to me now conflicts with the way it appears to me later. As things
now stand, then, the alternative account Gert offers turns on a piece of apparatus that goes beyond
what common sense can underwrite, and for which he demurs from offering further explanation.
I suggest that this renders the proposed alternative less than satisfying.
8 In assigning contents to both perceptual experiences and reports about them, here and below,
I am assuming that perceptual experiences determine correctness conditions. (For defense of this
assumption, see Byrne (2009); Pautz (2010); Siegel (2010); for criticism, see Travis (2004)). I am not
assuming that these correctness conditions can only be met by the obtaining of an “isomorphism”
between the experience and the distal property that is its content, as Gert speculates at one point
(17).
9Unique hues are typically described as those that are “perceptually unmixed”. Normal visual
perceivers will make relatively intrapersonally stable choices of stimuli (e.g., spectral lights or
Munsell chips) that look unique green (i.e., the sample looks green without looking at all bluish
or at all yellowish), unique red (looks red without looking at all bluish or yellowish), unique blue
(looks blue without looking at all reddish or at all greenish), and unique yellow (looks yellow
without looking at all reddish or at all greenish). The locus classicus for discussion of unique hues
and their import to philosophical accounts of color is Hardin (1988).
10In making this objection (in anticipation of a version of Gert’s view) in RR, I wrote that such a
report “would ordinarily be characterized as a report of the color experienced by the subject — not
the way in which the color is presented” (91). Gert finds that the phrase ‘the color experienced by
the subject,’ as it occurs in the formulation of the objection, is ambiguous between a reading that
picks out a way of appearing and one that picks out an “objective color” (9). For what it’s worth,
I don’t believe the phrase in question is ambiguous — I don’t hear any ambiguity, and I believe
the phrase fails standard tests for ambiguity. However, if it is ambiguous, I certainly didn’t intend
8
Gert responds to this objection by urging that, in fact, sometimes we do
seem to make reports about how things look in respect of color that are best
understood as having contents about the way colors appear rather than colors,
hence that his view is not guilty of any serious mislocation. Here is his
example:
If I am looking at an object that appears to me to be uniformly
colored green, but that happens to be situated near a blue wall, I
might utter the following three claims.
(U3) The object is manifestly a uniform shade of green.
(U4) There [demonstration of a part of the object far from the wall]
it looks unique green.
(U5) There [demonstration of a part of the object near to the wall]
it looks bluish green.
Given my expressed view in (U3) that the object is uniform in color,
the natural characterization of (U4) and (U5) cannot be as reports
of the objective color the object appears to have (9).
But this example doesn’t show what Gert takes it to. As far as I can tell,
(U4)/(U5) have two readings, corresponding to different disambiguations of
their occurrences of ‘it’, but neither of which sustains Gert’s contention.11 On
the first, ‘it’ is anaphoric on ‘the object’ in (U3), so (U4)/(U5) assert that, in one
of its demonstrated spatial parts, the object is visually represented as bearing
the property unique green/bluish green. Alas, this reading won’t serve Gert’s
purposes, since it construes (U4)/(U5) as reporting facts about the way the
object looks, not the way any color looks. The second reading, on which ‘it’
in (U4)/(U5) is anaphoric on (U3)’s occurrence of ‘a uniform shade of green’,
is prima facie more promising for Gert, since on this reading it may seem
that the attributions have features of a color as their contents. On secunda
facie, however, the imagined support this reading gives for Gert’s view falls
away. Again, the flatfooted (and now standard) understanding of such looks
locutions — viz., those of the form ‘P looks F ’, with predicates for colors
or other sensible properties as their grammatical subjects — treats them as
amounting to something like ‘P is visually represented as being F ’, or ‘P is
the objection to be construed as on Gert’s first reading: the point of the objection was to urge that
the ordinary report is naturally interpreted as not concerning the way of appearing. Therefore, in
reformulating the mislocation objection in the main text I have re-expressed it so as to avoid any
such ambiguity, and in the discussion that follows I consider only what Gert says about the second
reading.
11Gert could avoid the pronoun-binding ambiguity by use of the following alternative
formulations:
(U4′) There [demonstration δ] the color looks unique green.
(U5′) There [demonstration δ′] the color looks bluish green.
These formulations can only be read in a way analogous to the second reading of (U4)–(U5)
considered below; however, I’ll argue that the example doesn’t go through on this reading, so
the contemplated change doesn’t help.
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visually represented to me as if it were F ’.12 But if so, then on the reading under
consideration, (U4)/(U5) are reports about which color the object is visually
represented as being — which is just to say that, on this reading, too, they are
reports about the color the object has, contrary to what Gert claims.
Now, in the passage quoted above, Gert claims that his conclusion about
the content of (U4) and (U5) follows from their interaction with (U3); and I
have made only passing use of (U3) so far. Do things change if we suppose
that the subject additionally visually represents (U3)?13 I don’t see that they
do. For this supposition could potentially affect the contents of (U4)/(U5) only
if the subject’s visually representing the object’s color as uniform somehow
prevented her from having the variety of visual representations of its color
reported by (U4)/(U5). But, it’s hard to see why this should be the case.
For one thing, famously, a subject’s visual representations don’t all have to
be consistent, so it’s not clear why there should be the contemplated kinds of
exclusion relations between visual representations. For another, as discussed
in §1.1.2 above, there are several ways of understanding the content of (U3) that
render it consistent with (U4) and (U5) (where the latter are taken as reports of
varying visual representations of the color of an object).
In short, then, appeal to (U3) gives us no reason for wavering from the
understanding of the contents of (U4)/(U5) on which the latter are reports
about the colors of objects. Since the multiple aspects view entails that these —
and all similar reports — are not reports about the colors of objects, the charge
that that view suffers from a mislocation problem stands.
1.3 Gert on Interpersonal Variation
Although, as noted, Gert proposes different approaches to intrapersonal and
interpersonal instances of perceptual variation, there are important structural
similarities between his different approaches. In both sorts of cases, his view
is that there is no blameless variation with respect to the representation of
color, but only variation with respect to something that is finer-grained than
color. On the intrapersonal side, we have seen that the finer-grained entities in
question are aspects of colors. On the interpersonal side, he holds that the finer-
grained entities in question are relatively determinate precisifications of colors.14
In both sorts of cases, his view is that experiences of color (for a materially
12This is the comparative, or epistemic use of ‘looks’ discussed by (Chisholm, 1957; Jackson,
1977).
13The quoted passage doesn’t specify whether (U3)’s content (that the object is manifestly
uniform) is supposed to be visually represented, or merely believed/asserted. But if it is not
visually represented by the subject, then there’s no reason to take it as constraining the contents of
the visual representations she reports by (U4) and (U5) — this is why, for example, visual illusions
persist even after we recognize that they mislead.
14Gert’s way of putting this point involves holding that colors are “vague properties” (12), which
suggests that he’s assuming (controversially) that the relevant vagueness qualifies the properties
as opposed to the predicates. But I believe he can capture much of what he wants to say without
taking any stand on controversial issues about vagueness by instead formulating the point in terms
of the relations of relative determinacy between properties. His view, then, would be that colors are
less determinable than their precisifications, and that extensive blameless interpersonal perceptual
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uniform single stimulus) must be unvarying or uniform to be veridical, so there
can’t be blameless perceptual variation with respect to colors; but he allows
that there can be blameless perceptual variation with respect to something
finer-grained (intrapersonally: aspects/ways of appearing; interpersonally:
precisifications/determinates) such that there’s a one-many mapping from the
former to the latter. And his strategy, in both instances, is to insulate colors
from considerations about blameless perceptual variation by thinking of all
the variation as happening exclusively at the non-color level.
To see how this approach works concretely, consider the form of inter-
personal variation that has figured most centrally in recent philosophical
discussion of color — that involving the finding that settings for the four
chromatic unique hues vary significantly among visual perceivers who pass
standard clinical tests for normal color vision. Gert accepts that there is this
sort of extensive interpersonal variation, and, moreover (unlike many), that
it is blameless in the sense that there doesn’t seem to be anything that could
possibly make it the case that one normal perceiver is correct — to the exclusion
of others who disagree with her — about whether a 510nm spectral light, as
it might be, is really an instance of unique green. But since he construes the
variation in question only as variation about the “way a colored object can
appear” (10), he denies that these claims reveal any blameless variation with
respect to color.15
Gert admits that it is a counterintuitive consequence of his approach to
interpersonal variation that it requires saying that unique green is not a color,
but he regards this as a price worth paying. Indeed, he claims, the existence of
extensive blameless perceptual variation with respect to unique green (and the
like) is itself sufficient reason for denying that the latter is an object color:
a natural response to the question ‘Where, given this variability,
is unique green really to be found on the spectrum?’ would be
‘Nowhere’. And if it is really to be found nowhere, it is not an
object color (10).
if there is sufficient interpersonal variability in color experience
when those experiences are described with a high degree of pre-
cision (’unique green, ‘perfectly balanced orange’), then there is no
fact of the matter regarding the stable color of that object that has
that degree of precision (10).
Unfortunately, cases of extensive interpersonal perceptual variation extend
more broadly than Gert allows; consequently, consistent application of his view
results in denying the status of colors to not only fine-grained determinate
variation about the chromatic is confined to the relatively determinate level, so doesn’t apply to
colors properly speaking.
15Kuehni (2004) provides a useful overview of the extent of interpersonal variation for unique
hues. For alternative philosophical responses to this sort of variation that turn on denying that
the variation is blameless, see Tye (2006a,b, 2007); Byrne and Hilbert (2007); but see Cohen et al.
(2006a,b).
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properties like unique green, but also to less determinate, paradigmatic color
properties — those lexicalized in English color terms — such as green, blue,
orange and red.16 One impressive demonstration of such variation with respect
to intermediate/lexical colors comes from Malkoc et al. (2005). These authors
describe a color naming experiment in which normal subjects were shown
stimuli spanning the color circle in roughly equal steps, and were asked to label
the stimuli using one of eight color terms: four corresponding to the unique
hues (‘red’, ‘green’, ‘yellow’, and ‘blue’) and four corresponding to the binary
hues (‘orange’, ‘purple’, ‘blue- green’, and ‘yellow-green’). It turns out that
there was extensive disagreement in this naming task. For example, they report
that seven hue samples were labeled ‘blue’ by at least one subject, but there was
80% consensus in the application of that label to only two (and that all seven
were assigned color labels other than ‘blue’ at least once). Similarly, six samples
were labeled ‘yellow’ by at least one subject, but no stimulus commanded more
than 60% consensus in meriting the label ‘yellow’. (Examination of figure 4 of
Malkoc et al. (2005) shows that this degree of non-overlap was characteristic
of all of the eight unique and binary color categories). On the evidence, then,
there appears to be just the same sort of extensive and apparently blameless
interpersonal variation with respect to the representation of blue, yellow, and
the rest of the intermediate-level color properties that there is for the unique
hues. Again, given his other commitments, this suggests that Gert will be
forced to say that red, green, purple, yellow green, blue, yellow, blue green,
and orange are not colors. That seems bad.
Gert is aware of the threat to his view by such results, and offers three
objections in an attempt to explain away the recalcitrant evidence. First, he
follows (Byrne and Hilbert, 2007, note 5) in worrying that the color-naming
protocol and large within-subject variability reported by Malkoc et al. (2005)
complicates the interpretation of their results. But this concern is dubious:
16A similar worry can be raised with respect to the superdeterminable properties bluish,
yellowish, greenish, and reddish in terms of which the unique hues are defined. For if subject S1
represents a 510nm spectral light as unique green and S2 represents a 510nm spectral light as
bluish green, ipso facto they are manifesting interpersonal variation with respect to bluish. And if
the variation with respect to the unique hues is blameless, then so too must be the concomitant
variation with respect to the superdeterminables. It might seem then, that because Gert is willing
to infer from interpersonal variation data that the unique hues are not colors, he is likewise
committed to saying that bluish, yellowish, greenish, and reddish are not colors.
But Gert can avoid that consequence. For interpersonal variation in the unique hues only
commits Gert to saying that there are some cases of blameless interpersonal variation with respect
to the superdeterminables. And if it turns out that, despite these cases, there is, overall, substantial
interpersonal consensus about the application of these superdeterminables (i.e., that, overall,
interpersonal variation with respect to these superdeterminables is not blameless), then he won’t
be committed to denying their status as bona fide colors/properties. The relevant distinction
between unique green and greenish, then, is that, though there are cases of blameless interpersonal
variation with respect to both, there seems to be nothing but blameless interpersonal variation (i.e.,
no consensus cases) for unique green, while Gert thinks there are sufficiently many consensus cases
for greenish.
I suppose one could worry about how many cases of consensus, or what degree of consensus
within a community, is necessary for genuine color properties (Gert doesn’t say). In any case, I
won’t press these worries.
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while I’m not sure just what about color-naming is worrying Gert (or Byrne
and Hilbert), Malkoc et al. (2005) address the worry about large within-
subject variation by separately analyzing settings for the most consistent
subjects, and report that for these the correlations in repeated settings reached
0.8 (indicating between-subject variance roughly twice that of within-subject
variance).17 Second, Gert objects that, in order to maintain constant luminance
and saturation levels across stimuli, Malkoc et al. (2005) had to present samples
of some stimuli that were not typical/good focal exemplars of their categories.
Again, this concern is unpersuasive. It is true that some of the stimuli used
in this work may not have represented ideal focal examples of their categories
(in particular, for yellow because their foreground stimulus was isoluminant
with the background, and for red because the saturation was somewhat low).
However, the other six of the eight intermediate level properties tested are
relatively independent of saturation and lightness, so there is no reason to
suspect that their samples of the other colors were atypical. Since Malkoc et al.
(2005) found significant interpersonal variation for all eight of the intermediate
level colors tested, the non-focality of the samples corresponding to ‘red’ and
‘yellow’ can’t explain the observed variation.18
Be that as it may, Gert’s most important reason for wanting to dismiss
the empirical evidence of significant interpersonal variation about the inter-
mediate/lexical colors is not methodological, but transcendental. He holds
that there couldn’t be the sort of variation Malkoc et al. (2005) and others
claim to have found, since extensive interpersonal variation of that sort would
undermine the possibility of ostensive learning of color terms:
There has to be sufficient consensus on a sufficient class of objects,
as to their broad colors, to enable children to learn terms for these
colors by ostension and correction, since children obviously do
learn these terms. Any child who does not see the fire engine in
her “Babys First Color Book” as red, or the duck as yellow, or the
sky as blue, is suffering from some visual defect (12).
Once again, this consideration is unconvincing. For one thing, though it is
obvious that children do acquire color terms, it is not at all obvious whether
and to what extent ostension and correction play a significant role in the
process; as such, it is deeply unclear whether the variation in question conflicts
17Because Malkoc et al. (2005) don’t report within-subject variation for the specific result at issue
(that represented in figure 4), it is not clear what prompts the concern here. However, for other
tasks on which they report, they address this issue indirectly by reporting correlations between
repeated settings of the same hue: if all the variability were within-subjects, this correlation would
take the value 0, while if all variation were between-subjects, the correlation would be 1. They
report (2158) that such correlations were in all cases significant, which is to say that there was
statistically significant between-subject variation.
18I would add that, though I follow Gert above in confining attention to the striking evidence
of interpersonal variation in perception of lexical colors provided by Malkoc et al. (2005), this
ignores the independent (cross-cultural) empirical support for the same conclusion provided by,
e.g., Webster and Kay (2006); Lindsey and Brown (2009), to which Gert’s present methodological
worries are not applicable. (I am indebted to Mike Webster for discussion of the issues in this
paragraph.)
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with facts about learnability.19 For another, the kind of broad agreement in
color term application that would presumably be required by uniform labeling
of the objects in “Baby’s First Color Book” is not inconsistent with interpersonal
variation in the application of intermediate level color terms. We know this
must be so because even anomalous trichromats, dichromats, and others who
fail standard tests for normal color vision nonetheless largely converge on
the same application of color terms as those who do pass those tests; this is
why, for example, their visual anomalies typically go undetected for years.
Inter alia, this means that, despite varying extremely significantly from normal
perceivers in their perception of intermediate/lexical colors, these perceivers
perform like the rest of us with “Baby’s First Color Book”.20 The upshot, then,
is that, while the shared enjoyment of “Baby’s First Color Book” may require
some amount of communicative convergence in the application of lexical color
terms, this gives us no reason to doubt that (just as the data indicate) there is
significant interpersonal perceptual variation with respect to the intermediate
colors blue, yellow, green, orange, and the rest.
In summary, then, there appears to be significant and extensive inter-
personal perceptual variation with respect to both fine-grained chromatic
properties (such as unique green and unique blue) and intermediate/lexical
chromatic properties (such as red and orange). In the face of these results, Gert’s
strategy of describing variation as happening exclusively at the non-color level
will require that all of those chromatic properties are not colors. I suggest that a
theory of color that excludes from its domain not only unique green, unique blue,
unique red, and unique yellow, but also green, blue, red, yellow, blue green, yellow
green, orange, and purple, is not a theory we should want.21
19It is perhaps worth reminding ourselves that, over a long period, many psychologists and
linguists assumed that all language learning worked through ostension and correction. Chomsky’s
suggestion that it might not is a crucial element in his rejection of behaviorism, and therefore in
the development of modern cognitive science.
20Blatant conjecture: I suspect the observed convergence in labeling despite differences in
perception can be explained (given the assumption of perceptual variation) in terms of the routine
operation of conversational accommodation. (Analogy: although the NBA coach enters the
conversation with his own range for the application of the gradeable adjective ‘tall’, he easily
accommodates the high school coach’s application of the predicate to a high school player whose
height is six feet.)
Whether this (entirely conjectural) explanation of the convergence is correct or not, the point
in the main text stands: convergence in the communicative use of color terms is compatible with
large interpersonal differences in the perceptual representation of (intermediate/lexical level) color
categories.
21 Perhaps this is the place for a brief remark about Gert’s deflationary treatment of interspecies
variation. Gert holds that if S1 and S2 are members of different species, the perceptual states of
S1 and S2 can’t disagree (or agree) about whether o exemplifies P for any color P , since, roughly,
no single color is in the representational repertoire of perceptual systems from distinct species.
And he supports this view by claiming (14–15) that members of different species exhibit different
psychological color spaces.
While this proposal merits more discussion than I can give it here, I’ll just note that, in my
view, Gert is here both overestimating interspecies differences and underestimating intraspecies
differences. Our discussion of interpersonal differences has already brought to light the wide
range of at least certain kinds of (blameless) intraspecies variation; and while Gert may wish to
insist that all such variation is not blameless but evidence of a defect (15), this reaction is both
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2 Allen: Relationalism and Subject-Involving Con-
tents
Keith Allen is interested in, and critical of, a specific commitment of color
relationalism — viz., the claim that subjects are (always) constituents of the
contents of perceptual, cognitive and linguistic representations of color.22
He offers different arguments against subject-involving color contents in
perceptual representations on the one hand and cognitive and linguistic
representation on the other. I’ll reply to these considerations in §2.1 and §2.2,
respectively.
2.1 Subject-Involving Perceptual Representations?
2.1.1 Motivation
Allen begins his discussion of the representation of color in perceptual expe-
rience by observing, plausibly, that subject-involving contents are more com-
plicated than subject-independent contents. For this reason, he suggests that
we need motivations for embracing the more complicated, subject-involving
option.
I agree wholeheartedly with Allen that subject-involving perceptual rep-
resentations of color require motivation, and devote a large chunk of RR to
the task of offering such a motivation by reference to facts about perceptual
variation. Here is a short version.23
Consider an ordinary instance of perceptual variation — a case in which
two different visual systems have psychophysically distinguishable experien-
tial reactions to one and the same color stimulus, and let it be that (as per
standard but not universally shared assumptions; see note 8) those reactions
represent the color of the stimulus, or at the very least determine correctness
conditions about the stimulus color. Then we can ask which (if any) of
those representations is veridical. The following four answers exhaust logical
space: neither, the first but not the second, the second but not the first, or
both. But the neither-right answer is, plausibly, unduly skeptical: it leads
pretty quickly to the view that we all suffer from systematic and widespread
perceptual error as a matter of course. Moreover, the first-but-not-second and
stipulative and (on its face) inconsistent with the empirical evidence concerning normal human
color perceivers discussed above. On the evidence, there appear to be significant differences
between the color spaces of normal trichromatic human observers, greater differences between
those of normal trichromatic human observers and anomalous trichromatic human observers,
greater differences still between normal trichromatic human observers and dichromatic human
observers, and so on. But it is unclear that there’s the qualitative break between the intraspecies
differences, on the one hand, and interspecies differences, on the other, that Gert seems to be
assuming.
22Allen argues against the commitment to subject-involving contents that he finds in both the
relationalism of RR and also the “centering feature” view of Egan (2012); unfortunately, I must
omit discussion of the latter here for reasons of space.
23I present versions of this argument in several places; of course, my fullest elaboration and
defense of the argument occurs in RR itself.
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second-but-not-first answers are hard to motivate: since perceptual variation is
compatible with making the representations symmetric in just about any way
that could conceivably matter, it is hard to see what (beside ad hoc stipulation)
would make it the case that one of them is veridical to the exclusion of the
other. That leaves the final option — both representations are veridical —
as the best reaction to cases of perceptual variation. But this ecumenical
conclusion, in turn, motivates taking perceptual representation to be subject-
involving, in so far as the latter view explains how it could be that both
representations could be compatibly veridical. For the subject-involving color
contents (Color1) and (Color2) can be compatibly veridical in exactly the way
that the subject-involving contents about family members (Sister1) and (Sister2)
can be compatibly veridical.
(Sister1): Jane is the sister of S1.
(Sister2): Jane is not the sister of S2.
(Color1): Spectral light a is unique green for S1.
(Color2): Spectral light a is not unique green for S2.
There is, of course, much more to be said about this argument than I can say
here. Still, I hope that the abbreviated version presented here shows that the
relationalist has something to offer in response to Allen’s (reasonable) demand
for a motivation for subject-involving contents.
Questions of motivation aside, Allen presents two further objections against
subject-involving contents of perceptual experience. First, he worries that the
subject-involving aspect of such contents is redundant. Second, he objects that
the view overgeneralizes in such a way as to preclude perceptual error.
2.1.2 Redundancy
The worry about redundancy is that subject-involving content serves no
purpose for visual systems: a subject perceives the world with the same visual
system on every occasion, so specifying the subject in visual contents conveys
no information, and can serve no adaptive purpose for the organism.
My reaction to this objection is to accept it. As noted above, the most
important motivation for accepting subject-involving perceptual contents is
that such contents serve a purpose for (not the organism, but) the theorist
— viz., that of allowing her to describe perceptual experience in a way that
avoids undue skepticism. The content of perceptual experience is, of course, a
theoretical construct; as such, it should be characterized in whatever way best
serves the explanatory needs it is enlisted to serve. If I am right that subject-
involving contents serve the theoretical ends of explaining perceptual variation
without committing to systematic skepticism better than subject-independent
contents (and assuming that is a theoretical end worth having), then that
should be reason enough for accepting subject-involving contents.
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2.1.3 Lost Error
Allen’s second objection is that making the contents of perceptual experience
subject-involving threatens to foreclose the possibility of perceptual error.
The worry is that the relationalist’s ecumenicism overgeneralizes — that her
attempt to avoid asymmetric errors in the perceptual representation of color
amounts to holding that every (or nearly every) perceptual representation of
color is veridical. But this is just to say that (nearly) none of those perceptual
representations is erroneous.
Now, as Allen is well aware, representationalists have a strategy for
answering the charge of lost errors. This strategy involves the idea that we
have two separate levels of representation for color — a fine-grained, highly
determinate perceptual representation, and a coarser-grained, less determinate
representation for thought and language.24 On this proposal, a perceptual
experience might represent light a as exemplifying red for S in C, where
‘S’ and ‘C’ are relatively detailed specifications of my visual system and
my perceptual circumstance. Nonetheless, an utterance/thought about the
color of a occurring in context K would attribute to a a different and less
determinate — as it might be, red for the perceivers relevant in context K
under the perceptual circumstances relevant in K. This appeal to coarse-grained
color representation helps in answering the charge of lost errors because it
allows that there might be representational errors about color even if, per
the relationalist’s ecumenicism about perceptual representation, (nearly) all
perceptual representations of color are veridical. For example, suppose S’s
perceptual system veridically represents a as exemplifying red for S in C; still,
if S wrongly believes that S and C are K-relevant perceivers/circumstances,
she may infer/compute from her perceptual representation to the erroneous
conclusion that a exemplifies red for the perceivers relevant in context K under the
perceptual circumstances relevant in K. If she represents that conclusion, she will
be erroneously representing a’s color.25
24This is just the proposal discussed as a way of responding to one of Gert’s objections involving
the uniform pink shirt in §1.1.2 above.
25 As Allen is also aware, this strategy is not the only means by which relationalists can allow
for perceptual errors of color representation. Here are three other relationalist-friendly strategies
that come to mind.
A first additional strategy involves hallucination. Thus, suppose, in a hallucinatory experience,
I perceptually represent my hat as exemplifying red (for myself in the circumstances I am in),
although my hat is nowhere in the vicinity. Then the relationalist is within her bounds to call
the hallucinatory experience an error involving the perceptual representation of color.
A second additional strategy involves the representation of the sorts of
counterfactuals relating different colored objects/patches discussed in §1.1.2. To
see what this amounts to, consider Adelson’s well-known checkershadow illusion
(http://web.mit.edu/persci/people/adelson/checkershadow illusion.html),
in which, given the illumination cues and other details about the configuration, viewers typically
find it surprising to learn that two very different looking patches labeled ‘A’ and ‘B’ are
intrinsically qualitatively identical. The relationalist will describe this case as involving an illusion
about the color that the chips would be manifesting were they presented under the same viewing
condition. She will say that (in addition to representing A and B as occurrently manifesting
different colors) subjects represent A and B as being such as to mismatch perceptually were they
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Unfortunately, Allen is dissatisfied with this answer. He worries that,
though it may save the possibility of error for the relationalist, it doesn’t
allow for errors of perceptual representation, since it locates the error in the
(post-perceptual) coarse-grained representations figuring in the cognitive and
linguistic representation of color. He presses this worry by considering a
grapheme→color synesthete in whom exposure to the numeral ‘6’, printed
in black ink, reliably causes (automatic/involuntary) representations of both
green and black. Assuming that these representations are both perceptual,
relationalists seem committed to saying that both are veridical, hence that the
numeral is both black to this subject under this circumstance and green to this
subject under this circumstance. “But,” he writes, “this doesn’t seem especially
plausible” (5).
Alas, I find this objection less than convincing: I see three (independent)
lines of response to it that are available to relationalists. First, I confess to not
seeing what is problematic in holding that the numeral genuinely exemplifies
both relational colors. (Surely the worry can’t be that this would make those
properties collapse; after all, the properties will come apart in their application
to other objects even if they coincide in applying to inscriptions of ‘6’.) If
so, then the case under consideration is not a case of misrepresentation of
color, so not a lost error that relationalists are unable to describe. Second,
the objection depends on presupposing that synesthetic color representations
are perceptual; but this is deeply controversial, at least partly because there
is no generally accepted method for distinguishing between perceptual and
cognitive representations. But if the presupposition is false, then the case
is ripe for treatment in terms of the relationalist strategy outlined above.
Third, even those (such as myself; see Cohen (2013)) who regard synesthetic
and normal perception as importantly similar will nonetheless allow that
there remain respects in which synesthetic representations are abnormal, which
suggests that their etiology is in some respect deviant (whence the standard
(as they are in fact not) presented under a shared circumstance — in effect, their visual systems are
predicting that the chips would look different (would not match) were they presented in identical
circumstances. But this last representation is erroneous: the regions would indeed be a perceptual
match were they presented in identical circumstances. Thus, the relationalist has the means to say
that, in this and other cases we normally describe as color illusions, the visual system is indeed
misrepresenting a color property.
A third additional strategy involves deviant causal chains. Thus, to return to a fanciful example
from Cohen (2007), if a telekinetic tomato stimulates my visual cortex without affecting my retina,
and subsequently attending to that tomato causes in me the reaction I normally get when looking at
ordinary, non-telekinetic, ripe tomatoes, then my perceptual representation of its color is obtained
through a deviant causal chain. If this is the right description of the situation, then it seems
plausible on grounds independent of relationalism to say that the perceptual representation in
question is erroneous by virtue of having a deviant etiology. (Allen objects (5) that the admittedly
unusual etiology in question still runs through the visual system, so is perhaps not deviant after
all. In fairness, it is difficult to judge the particular case in the absence of a principled criterion
of deviance; and I don’t have one. But the viability of the strategy on offer is independent of
verdicts about the particular example. The point is that a relationalist can — for principled reasons
independent of her relationalism — describe as erroneous any perceptual representations of color
whose etiologies count as deviant. As such, the existence of deviant perceptual causation offers the
relationalist yet another way of describing some perceptual representations of color as erroneous.)
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description of the condition as a psychological/neural pathology). But if
so, then this very deviance is a reason for describing such representations
as erroneous, even assuming the general relationalist view that non-deviant
perceptual representations of color are almost always veridical (cf. note 25).
Given the availability of these responses, I do not see that consideration
of synesthetic color representations reveals any serious shortcoming in the
relationalist’s account of color misrepresentation.
2.2 Subject-Involving Cognitive/Linguistic Representations?
RR claims not only that perceptual representations of colors are subject-
involving, but that the same is true about cognitive and linguistic represen-
tations of color. Once again, Allen disagrees: he holds that cognitive and
linguistic color contents are subject-independent.
Now, it must be granted that ordinary color ascriptions in natural language
— which presumably comprise a crucial source of evidence about the contents
of linguistic and cognitive representations of color — are typically not overtly
subject-involving. We ordinarily utter (1a) rather than (1b):
(1a) That ripe lemon is yellow.
(1b) That ripe lemon is yellow for S (in C).
But this does not establish that linguistic/cognitive color contents are not
subject-involving, for it could be that subject-involving elements are added
(possibly in a way that is sensitive to features of the context of utterance)
to these contents despite not being present in the overt linguistic form of
utterances expressing them. Something like this story is plausible for many
different natural language expressions; for example, it is standard to hold that
gradeable adjectives (e.g., ‘large,’ ‘expensive,’ ‘tasty,’ ‘close’) have as part of
their content a covert/unpronounced, contextually determined, standard of
comparison (large for an elephant, expensive for a taco, etc.).26 In RR I propose
that something similar is true about linguistic/cognitive color contents — viz.,
that the latter have a (contextually supplied) subject-involving element despite
the absence of overt elements of this sort in the surface form of linguistic color
ascriptions. And I offer a contextualist semantics for natural language color
terms that is intended to sustain this suggestion. Specifically, I propose that
the predicate ‘is yellow’, as uttered in context K, expresses the property yellow
for the perceivers relevant in context K under the perceptual circumstances relevant
in K (100; mutatis mutandis for other color predicates).
Allen argues that this proposal misdescribes the semantic behavior of ordi-
nary color terms. For, he claims, such terms fail three standard diagnostics for
context-sensitivity (completability, context shifting, and collection; see §2.2.2).
He allows that one might nonetheless defend a revisionary contextualist
semantics as a proposal for linguistic reform; but he takes the evidence to
26See Klein (1991); Kennedy (2007).
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show that the contextualist treatment is descriptively inadequate. And since
he thinks contextualism remains the best hope for defending subject-involving
cognitive and linguistic color contents, he concludes that such contents are, on
the evidence, best construed as subject-independent.
2.2.1 Contextualism as Revision
I will argue (§2.2.2) that the evidence against the contextualist proposal for
color predicates is indecisive. However, before I come to that, I want to concede
that Allen’s main conclusion may be true: I accept that contextualism may
be descriptively inadequate as an account of ordinary color language. (My
concession is not that the evidence demonstrates the descriptive inadequacy
of the view decisively; it is that, for all the evidence shows, the view may be
descriptively inaccurate.) Instead, I have come to think that the contextualist
semantics in RR is best construed as a revisionary proposal.27
To see what I have in mind, consider the analogous question about how
we should think about the semantics of motion predicates after the discovery
that, on the best, broadly empirical account, motion properties are constituted
in terms of relations to reference frames. Of course, our motion predicates (e.g.,
‘is moving at 60mph’) predate this broadly empirical discovery. As such, it is
extremely plausible that these predicates do not come equipped with unfilled
covert parameters for reference frames as part of their lexical information; and
they are certainly not overtly relativized to reference frames. But if so, then
it is hard to see how such predicates could have as semantic values the kinds
of motion properties that our best broadly empirical theories of the world tell
us there are. And in this case, it would seem that all of our thought and talk
about motion must be systematically false or gappy. Surely, however, this is a
conclusion we should want to avoid.
Luckily, we theorists have a way out: we can allow that, following this kind
of discovery about the world, we should revise the semantics of motion ascrip-
tions. On the revised view, we allow that contextual supplementation helps our
overtly unrelativized motion predicates refer to the available relational motion
properties, and thereby allow that ordinary motion ascriptions can be true.
I propose adoption of contextualism about color discourse in the same,
revisionary, spirit. Here, too, I claim, our best, broadly empirical empirical
account tells us that colors are constituted in terms of relations to (inter alia)
subjects (as per the argument in §2.1.1). Hence, in order to avoid rendering
false or gappy all of the utterances that make use of color predicates predating
this broadly empirical discovery, we should accept a revisionary contextualist
semantics of color ascriptions (such as that proposed in RR) that will allow our
overtly unrelativized color predicates to refer to the available relational color
properties.28
27This reflects a change in my own view about the meta-narrative of the contextualist proposal
of RR.
28If I admit (even provisionally) that making linguistic representations of color subject-involving
amounts to a revision of linguistic usage, then I cannot hold that data about linguistic usage
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2.2.2 Diagnostics for Context Sensitivity
I have admitted that my preferred contextualist explanation of how linguistic
color contents could be subject-involving may be descriptively false. Moreover,
I claim that this outcome would neither drain the interest of RR’s contextualism
qua revisionary semantics for color predication nor impugn the argumentative
purposes to which contextualism is put in that work.
That said, I do not believe that the evidence Allen appeals to in attempting
to demonstrate the descriptive inadequacy of contextualism is successful. Let
me say why.
Completion: The first diagnostic to which Allen appeals involves comple-
tion. The thought here is that expressions whose overt linguistic forms are
semantically incomplete, and for which context is thought to supply needed,
missing information, typically permit overt specification of the completing
material. Thus, for example, while (2a)–(4a) are standardly taken to be
semantically incomplete in the relevant sense, each permits supplementation
by further linguistic material that results in a the completed counterparts (2b)–
(4b).
(2a) The beach is nearby.
(3a) It is raining.
(4a) John’s wedding is on Friday at 3.
(2b) The beach is nearby to the cafe.
(3b) It is raining in Seattle.
(4b) John’s wedding is on Friday the 23rd of March, 2012, at 3pm PDT.
Likewise, on the contextualism of RR, ordinary color ascriptions are se-
mantically incomplete in their overt linguistic form but supplemented by
contextually supplied information. Consequently, barring some independent
explanation, we should expect that ordinary color ascriptions like (1a) permit
expansion into their completed counterparts like (1b). Alas, Allen claims, this
prediction fails: (1b) is unacceptable.
The problem with this argument is that, as Allen recognizes (11), linguistic
intuitions about the acceptability/unacceptability of (1b) and similar examples
are extremely variable. I suggest, then, that completion judgments provide at
best weak support for the claim that color ascriptions are context-insensitive.
motivate either (i) a subject-involving construal of perceptual representations of color, or (ii)
relationalism about the metaphysics of color properties. But I never attempted to argue for (i)
and (ii) in that way. On the contrary, my argument for (i) and (ii) in RR comes from considerations
about the psychophysics of perception (see §2.1.1). My concern with linguistic usage in RR was
not driven by a need to argue directly for conclusions (i) and (ii); rather, it was to show how an
independently motivated commitment to (i) and (ii) could be squared with facts about the usage
of color language.
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Context shifting: Allen’s second diagnostic for context sensitivity involves
the possibility of shifting interpretations of a context-sensitive term within a
sentence as a result of shifting the context midway through an utterance of that
sentence. Thus, for example, the availability of a true reading of (5) depends on
the possibility of interpreting the (context-sensitive) gradeable adjective ‘small’
relative to two different delineations:
(5) That is a small elephant but not a small animal.29
A second example, which Allen takes from Jackson (2007, 312), involves a sign
on the car deck of a ferry containing the instruction:
(6) Cars must not move while the ferry in motion.
Again, it is plausible that this instruction makes sense only because of the pos-
sibility of interpreting the two different (context-sensitive) motion predicates
it contains (‘must not move’, ‘in motion’) relative to two distinct, contextually
supplied reference frames.30
In contrast, Allen urges that color predicates do not allow this sort of
intrasentential context-shifting behavior with respect to an alleged parameter
for perceivers:
For instance, it would seem strange to say:
19) ?The bucket is blue, but the spade is blue-green
if the bucket and the spade are intra-personally indistinguishable in
colour to Jack and Jill, but what is meant is that the bucket is blue
for Jack, and the spade is blue-green for Jill (13–14).
Once again, I find this argument less than persuasive. As Allen himself
notes (14), many paradigmatically context-sensitive expressions — e.g., ‘en-
emy’, ‘foreigner’, modal ‘can’, and ‘nearby’ — generally resist this sort of
context-shifting as well (cf. Stanley (2005, 72, note 16)). But if we fail to observe
the relevant kind of context-shifting with those paradigmatically context-
sensitive expressions, the observation that color predicates also typically fail to
exhibit context-shifting cannot justify the conclusion that the latter are context-
insensitive.31
29The delineations relevant to the interpretation of ‘small’ are plausibly provided (somehow) by
the sortals occurring explicitly in (5); I grant, arguendo, that this kind of lexical supplementation
counts as contextually supplied.
30Again, I’m prepared to concede for the sake of argument that the intended interpretation of (6)
depends on an intrasentential context-shift.
31I suspect that at least part of what drives linguistic judgments about context-shifting cases
(about color predicates and other putatively context-sensitive expressions) is that it can be difficult
to pull off contextual shifts in the midst of utterances without compromising felicity. Support for
this conjecture comes from the observation that when we move to situations in which the relevant
aspect of context — here, contextually relevant perceiver type — are more naturally expected
to shift, context-shifting sentences go down more smoothly. Thus, in the vision lab, a normal
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Disagreement: Allen’s third and final diagnostic for context-sensitivity in-
volves the possibility of disagreement about color. Briefly, the idea is that, if
an expression e is context-sensitive, and if a speaker S1 applies that expression
to a in context C1 while a second speaker S2 forbears that expression to a in
context C2, then it is not guaranteed that there is any single property about
whose extension the first and second speakers are disagreeing. For, given the
context-sensitivity of e, it could be that S1’s use of e in C1 and S2’s use of e
in C2 pick out different properties. Thus, the collective indirect disagreement
report in (8c) fails when the original utterances in (8a) and (8b) include the
context-sensitive ‘nearby’, but (barring ambiguity, irony, etc.) succeeds when
we substitute the context-insensitive expression ‘square’:32
(8a) S1 in C1: a is nearby/square.
(8b) S2 in C2: a is not nearby/square.
(8c) S3 in C3: S1 and S2 disagree about whether a is #nearby/square.
Allen takes this not to show that there cannot be collection of the relevant
sort involving utterances containing ‘nearby’ or other context-sensitive expres-
sions. Instead, he takes it to show that if there is such collection, then the value
of the contextual parameter(s) to which those expressions are sensitive must be
shared between contexts C1 and C2 (and perhaps also C3).33
Of course, disagreements about color (of the sort that can be reported by
such collective indirect reports) are rampant — thus, pairs like (9a) and (9b)
are common, and appear to legitimate reports such as (9c):
(9a) S1 in C1: a is red.
(9b) S2 in C2: a is not red.
(9c) S3 in C3: S1 and S2 disagree about whether a is red.
trichromatic experimenter preparing a stimulus for her protanopic subjects can remark felicitously
to another experimenter,
(7) This red patch is grey.
(What Allen says about similar examples (14) suggests that he would reject this case, insisting,
with Pritchard (1909), that (7) is elliptical for
(7′) This red patch looks grey.
I just don’t see any reason to hold that this must be so.)
32Authors who rely heavily on (versions of) this diagnostic for context-sensitivity include
(Cappelen and Lepore, 2006; Cappelen and Hawthorne, 2009).
33Caponigro and Cohen (2011) argue that, strictly speaking, this conclusion is unjustified: for
there can be collection over utterances of context-sensitive expressions even when the values
of the relevant contextual parameters mismatch. Consequently, we argue, the collection test is
unsuccessful as a diagnostic for context-sensitivity in the way that Allen (following Cappelen and
Lepore (2006); Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009)) employs it. I’ll put this aside, however, since
I doubt that the possibility of disagreements about the application of color predicates depends
entirely on the kinds of counterexamples raised by Caponigro and Cohen (2011).
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By reasoning parallel to that concerning (8a)–(8c), Allen suggests that the
inference involving (9a)–(9c) should be possible, given the contextualist’s view
that color predicates are context-sensitive, only if the value of the putative
perceiver-type parameter is shared between contexts C1 and C2. But since,
he worries, there doesn’t appear to be any reason that that condition will be
met, contextualism about color predicates threatens to make ordinary linguistic
disagreement about color rare or impossible.
Once again, I remain unpersuaded.
On the contextualist semantics outlined above (§2.2), what is expressed
by an utterance in K of a color predicate contains a parameter filled by the
K-relevant perceiver-type. Therefore, the perceiver-type parameters relevant
to the evaluation of (9a) and (9b) will have the same value only if the C1-
relevant perceiver-type = the C2-relevant perceiver-type. Crucially, however,
it is plausible that, in many ordinary contexts, what counts as the contextually-
relevant perceiver-type is fairly unspecific and broad —- broad enough, in any
case, that it will overlap with the contextually relevant perceiver-type of many
other ordinary contexts.
None of this is to deny Allen’s contention that there exist pairs of contexts
relative to which the contextually-relevant perceiver-types will not match.34
Indeed, I stand by the contextualist prediction that the inference from (9a)
and (9b) to (9c) — and, indeed, the intuition that (9a) and (9b) express
intercontextual disagreement — breaks down relative to such pairs of contexts.
That prediction would be objectionable if it entailed that such inferences
always fail relative to an arbitrary pair of contexts, i.e., that there is no
intercontextual disagreement about color. But it does not.35
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